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I. INTRODUCTION
For better or for worse, probably for the worse in view of their
overwhelming negative economic, cultural and psychological con-
sequences in most underdeveloped countries, many Third World
countries believe that private foreign investments have a critical
role to play in the process of development. Yet even the most
liberal of these countries have, in varying degrees, introduced or
begun to introduce national measures intended to direct and con-
trol the extent, nature and areas of operation of foreign private
enterprises within their national economies.
With the changing nature of foreign private investments, na-
tional measures have in general been adapted to cope with the
new situations as they arise. Investments are no longer limited to
ownership of subsidiaries and affiliates or branches but are in-
creasingly taking the form of equity shareholdering in joint ven-
tures, technological input, personnel and management. Problems
that generally arise with respect to private foreign investments
include those relating to nationalization, taxation, remittance of
profits and royalties as well as professional fees, and terms and
conditions of employment of both local and expatriate personnel.
These problems have been and continue to be resolved by vari-
ous legal and non legal techniques. If the experiences of the past
decades are any indication, one would expect further erosion of
the traditional patterns of private foreign investments. Increased
local participation, whether government or private, is to be ex-
pected. The "technojurist"'I can then be expected to devise legal
structures to cope with the new situation.
*Senior Research Fellow. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
' The expression "technojurist" is used here to designate a jurist who confines himself to
purely legal aspects of a social phenomenon to the detriment of other basic meta-legal fac-
tors.
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This paper intends to analyse the evolution of practices with
respect to the resolution of international problems relating to
private foreign investments. It is hoped that an historical ap-
proach will assist us in predicting the direction of change in the
next forty years.
There are, however, certain definitional and substantive prob-
lems that must be resolved in order to enable the reader to under-
stand the focus of the paper. The definitional problems relate to
the terms, "legal structures," "international" and "problems."
On the face of it, the term "legal structures" would seem to
relate only to the institutional framework for the resolution of in-
ternational problems. Since institutions by themselves, though
necessary, are not enough for the resolution of problems, it is our
understanding that substantive and procedural rules are intended
to form part of the "legal structures."
The term "international" is capable of a narrow or wide inter-
pretation. In classical international law, or indeed international
relations, the term was used to cover only relations between sub-
jects of international law which, before the emergence of interna-
tional organizations endowed with international legal personality,
embraced only States. It is now widely accepted that private per-
sons, even when they do not possess international personality,
have a role to play in international relations; and that insofar as
their operations cut across national boundaries they can be
categorized as international. Furthermore, even if one were to
regard such activities as initially purely private and, therefore,
falling outside the ambit of international regulation, international
law either in the form of ever controversial minimum standards or
treaties is invariably invoked.
In ordinary parlance the word "problems" is very wide and
could be used to cover all manner of issues including disputes that
may arise at the international level. Since, however, the subject
matter deals with legal structures, it is presumed that we are con-
cerned with judicial or quasi-judicial methods of settlement of
disputes and/or problems. It is not unusual for international
agreements to provide for nonjudicial methods of resolving inter-
national problems such as by negotiation or conciliation Under
See 0. EZE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMON
MARKET 310 (1975).
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such circumstances it is the legal structure that creates the basis
for the nonjudicial processes.
Finally, the substantive issue relates to the apparent assump-
tion that "legal structures" are the primary means for the resolu-
tion of international problems. It is one of the fundamental
postulates of this paper that the resolution of international prob-
lems is not a purely mechanical affair. The law, including its in-
stitutions and substance, has invariably, though not exclusively,
responded to the basic structure of society often characterised by
social relations which have been determined by the control of
economic and political power.
In interstate relations power has invariably determined the
nature of economic relations, and in the field of private property,
and indeed private foreign investments, this pattern can be amply
demonstrated.
The point is that in making a prognosis as to the resolution of
international problems in the next forty years, it will serve little
or no purpose to concentrate on purely legal techniques, rules and
institutions. The ultimate determinant of legal phenomenon must
form the point of departure for our efforts. Thus the balance of
forces, such as competing ideologies and the state of development
or underdevelopment, among others, will form part of the equa-
tion of our analysis.
This paper will deal with the resolution of problems arising
from private foreign investments both at the national and interna-
tional levels. While it is recognized that effective resolution of
such problems may involve questions of recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgements, time and space will not allow for
their treatment in this paper. Nor will the problems that might
arise where, as is increasingly the case in many Third World coun-
tries, states are becoming parties to foreign investment ventures
be dealt with here.
II. PROBLEM RESOLUTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The expansion of capitalism, especially after the industrial
revolution, led not only to the conquest and appropriation of
foreign lands but also to the extension of capitalist philosophy as
well as economic relations to the new world.3 Increased economic
I A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 193 (rev. ed. 1954); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1962); Abdalla, Hetrogeneity
and Differentiation-The End for the Third World?, 2 DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 11 (1978).
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relations with non-European states led to the establishment of
norms that would govern such relationships. It was during this
period that the so-called minimum standard of international law
was established. Initially enforced by the United Kingdom, at the
epoch the leading maritime and financial power, it was subse-
quently strengthened and supported by other capitalist countries,
among whom was the United States.'
It was sought to apply the minimum standard, enshrining as it
did capitalist principles, a concept that had already been applied
between European states, to the new actors in international rela-
tions. This standard was reinforced by the principle of state
responsibility which purported to impose obligations on states to
make reparations in the event of a breach of the minimum stan-
dard of international law.
It has proved difficult to determine the exact contents of the
minimum standard of international law. Proponents of this stan-
dard conceded to the State the right to rectify alleged wrongs
relating to private foreign investments which have taken place in
areas or by persons within its jurisdiction. If the state failed to
meet the requirements of the minimum standard, such as by
denial or delay of justice or by the nonexistence of due process,
that state was said to have committed a breach of international
law. Thus, a dispute originally within the purview of domestic
regulation was transmuted into an international dispute.
Apart from the imprecise nature of the minimum standard of in-
ternational law the very validity of the concept has been subject
to constant challenge. The Russian Bolshevic Revolution of 1917,
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 providing for nationalization of
agrarian lands, and the emergence of states hitherto under col-
onial rule to independence, shattered the foundation and apparent
stability of the international economic legal order.
With respect to nationalization of alien property, the argument
has been advanced that for the requirements of the minimum
standard to be met, the taking must be for public purpose and the
compensation to be paid must be full, i.e. adequate, prompt and ef-
fective. It has been refuted that such requirements were met dur-
ing nationalization in Europe, and many Third World countries
have challenged the validity of such requirements. In fact, the
decisions in two recent cases arising from the Anglo Iranian Oil
SCHWARZENBERGER, sup'ra note 3, at 61.
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nationalization measures do not support the existence of such a
minimum standard of international law.'
From the foregoing discussion, it is already clear that even the
very substance of the law that should govern private foreign in-
vestments is not agreed upon. At the national level there have
been variations of the so called minimum standard. Compensation
where it is paid is normally "fair," although it may be argued that
what is fair could be full or adequate. In some cases it is paid out
of future profits, and in others, by agreement, the payment may not
be "effective" in the sense of being paid in convertible currency.
Related to the question of the minimum standard are two issues
which have gained importance in recent years. These are the ex-
tent to which international law should impinge upon the right of a
state to regulate private foreign investments and the competence
of state tribunals or agencies to finally determine issues arising
out of investment transactions.
It is not necessary for us to determine in this paper whether the
passing of national regulations allegedly infringing on the mini-
mum standard of international law by itself constitutes a breach
of international law. What is clear is that if we accept the ex-
istence of such a minimum standard, we automatically impose a
limit, in certain respects, on the right of a state to make laws and
regulations as to the treatment of foreign investors in a host
state.
It may further be argued that since the constitutions of many
developing countries contain formulations similar but not
necessarily identical in all cases with the traditional prescriptions
for nationalization, in general espoused by the capital exporting
countries, these could be regarded as general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. This argument does not hold much
water since national constitutions are domestic legislation, albeit
of a special type, and can be changed at will. Furthermore, ex-
periences in many African countries show that the constitutions
are susceptible to being overthrown or suspended and cannot,
therefore, be regarded as sacrosanct.
We are left then with treaty law as the only solid base on which
to construct concrete rules that should, to the extent that they are
' See Anglo Iranian Oil Company Ltd. V. Societa Kaisha, Japan ILR, 1953, at 305; Anglo
Iranian Oil Company Ltd V. Societa Supor XXX. Italy, ILR, 1955, at 23. The British Case
of Anglo Iranian Oil Company Ltd Jaffarate (The Rosemary) Aden ILR, 1953, at 316-was
in favour of the status quo.
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not governed by national regulation, govern and regulate prob-
lems that may arise from private foreign investments. As will be
demonstrated later, even treaty law is inadequate to deal with the
situation since it must invariably refer to other bodies of substan-
tive law that should regulate problems arising out of private
foreign investments.
There are certain areas, however, in which the competence of a
state to legislate cannot be questioned. Thus in the fields of taxa-
tion, exchange control, labour legislation, immigration matters,
and limits of foreign participation, all of which affect foreign in-
vestments, states have the untramelled right, subject only to in-
ternational obligations expressly undertaken by them, to regulate
them by national laws, regulations and policies.
Another related problem is that of machinery for the resolution
of problems arising out of foreign investments. We have already
shown that classical international law recognized the right of a
host state to remedy a wrong that has been committed by persons
or entities within its jurisdiction. Thus, it is not only the substan-
tive and procedural laws of the host state that come into play, but
also the relevant institutions that are empowered to apply regula-
tions on private foreign investment. But the problem is not that
simple. National laws, including conflicts of law rules, responding
to the "free enterprise spirit" of western Europe and extended to
most of the Third World during the colonial days, allowed parties
to choose the law which should apply to their contracts, as well as
the tribunal which has competence to deal with the matter. If no
law was chosen, the parties were presumed to have chosen a par-
ticular system with which the transaction had some form of con-
nection. This could mean that while the courts or tribunals of the
host state might be seized of a problem, they could be obliged to
apply some laws other than those of the host state. Where a
tribunal other than that of the host state has been chosen, the con-
flict of law rules, where no express choice of law has been made,
would determine what law is applicable.
III. VANISHING CONSENSUS ON TRADITIONAL RULES FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS PROBLEMS
We have already indicated in connection with the minimum
standard of international law with respect to conditions and terms
of compensation for nationalized property, that there has been a
diminishing consensus on its actual contents that renders it rather
[Vol. 9:535
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precarious as a base for the resolution of investment problems. If
some states have paid compensation, apparently on the basis of
the traditional rules, the reason must, for the most part, be found
outside the confines of normative rules. Pressures of all forms
from the country of the investor, sometimes in alliance with other
capital exporting countries, and the somewhat ambivalent need
for future good relations with capital exporting countries would
seem to suffice in many, if not in most, cases to induce compliance.
Third World countries are increasingly asserting the finality of
national regulation in the field of private foreign investments. We
have already referred to the Bolshevic Revolution of 1917 and the
Mexican Agrarian Revolution as laying the foundations for assault
against the traditional practice. Deriving rationalization from the
Calvo Clause,' Latin American states started inserting in their
concession contracts clause under which foreign investors de-
nounced their right to dipolmatic protection. Subject to certain
limitations with respect to the right to diplomatic protection if
there was delay or denial of justice, arbitral tribunals tended on
the whole to uphold the validity of Calvo Clauses. There had been
in the interval various attempts by some Third World countries
and Third World organizations to exclude international law as the
final basis on which to resolve investment problems.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, voted
against by the majority of western capital exporting countries,
confirmed this Third World posture by accepting that disputes
arising from nationalization of alien property are to be settled by
national courts and tribunals unless otherwise agreed.'
Given this state of uncertainty, western capital exporting coun-
tries have sought to use certain devices to restore the acceptance
of some minimum norms of conduct that would regulate foreign in-
vestment transactions. Reliance is placed primarily on bilateral
agreements which not only provide what law should govern a
private foreign investment transaction but also the modalities and
institutions for resolution of any problem arising therefrom. Some
' The Calvo Doctrine is the doctrine that a government is not bound to indemnify aliens
for losses or injuries sustained by them in consequence of domestic disturbances, where the
state is not at fault, and that therefore foreign states are not justified in intervening to
secure the claims of their citizens on account of such losses or injuries. Such intervention,
according to Calvo, is not in accordance with the practice of European States towards one
another, and is contrary to the principle of state sovereignty. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257
(4th ed. 1951).
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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of these arguments, as already indicated, provide for non judicial
methods of settlement of investment disputes before resort is had
to judicial or quasi-judicial organs or tribunals.
Where judicial settlement is envisioned both domestic and in-
ternational law, the latter either concurrently or at a later stage,
are deemed to be applicable, thus leaving the problem of the ex-
tent of applicability of international law to private foreign in-
vestments unanswered.
At the multilateral level the IBRD (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development) Convention on the settlement of
investment disputes could not provide a means around the im-
passe. What the Convention did do was to codify the status quo
with all of its unresolved issues. Article 42 of the Convention con-
tains the kernel of what law should apply to investment disputes.
Under this provision the tribunal is to decide the dispute either in
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the par-
ties, or the law of the contracting state party to the dispute (in-
cluding its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of interna-
tional law as may be applicable.8
These unresolved problems remain some of the basic areas of
divergence between the developed countries, including Eastern
European countries, and the developing countries in the current
effort to elaborate an International Code of Conduction of the
Transfer of Technology under the aegis of UNCTAD. The
developed countries of the west, in consonnance with the spirit of
"free enterprise" and minimum interference in contractual rela-
tions, and the Eastern European countries, now internally much
better organized and in a position to deal with and contain
destabilizing effects of external forces, have opted on the whole
for the traditional rules which allow, with certain limitations, free
choice of law by the parties.' The position of the Third World
countries has remained essentially the same. Initially their posi-
tion was that the law of the technology acquiring country should
be applied by the courts or tribunals of the same. Even where
some foreign law was to apply, the tribunal of the technology ac-
quiring country would have competence to decide on the matter.
The current proposal of the Group of 77, which was circulated
during the First Conference, makes a distinction between matters
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, TIAS No. 1502, 2 UNTS 134, art. 42.
' See TDICODE TOT/9, Appendix G, at 42-44 (Nov. 11, 1978).
[Vol. 9:535
1979] LEGAL STRUCTURES -FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 543
of public policy (ordre public) and sovereignty and matters of
private interest."0 With respect to the former the law applicable
shall be that of the acquiring country. It is further declared that
"'any contractual clause which would be in violation of the public
policy (ordre public) and sovereignty of the acquiring state, par-
ticularly in matters concerning its governmental prerogatives or
its legislative, regulatory or administrative powers, shall be null
and void."" The law applicable to matters of private interest is
that which has a direct, effective and permanent relationship with
the transaction. Parties can only choose a law which conforms
with these requirements.
We do not intend in this paper to go into a juridical analysis of
the terms used. Suffice it to say, however, that the Group of 77,
even while adopting a somewhat less rigid position than was
hitherto the case, has managed to indirectly retain the notion that,
essentially the law of the technology acquiring country should
govern transfer of technology transactions. This line of reasoning
is confirmed by sub-paragraph 5, of paragraph A, which provides
that "The law of the acquiring party shall apply to questions of
characterization. In particular, it alone shall be applicable for the
determination of matters that may not be submitted to arbitration
or which concern public policy or sovereignty."'2
While Group D countries are more interested in arbitration
tribunals as avenues for the settlement of disputes, the Group of
77 and Group B countries lay more emphasis on judicial settle-
ment of disputes. According to Group B, parties to a technology
transfer agreement should be freely permitted to chose the court
before which disputes relating to the agreement shall be tried.
Any such choice should be given effect unless there is no
reasonable basis (referring apparently to the traditional criteria
enumerated in paragraph 7 (2) of Group B's text) or the choice
places an onerous burden on one of the parties. In addition, par-
ties are to be freely permitted to choose arbitration or other third
party procedures.'"
Group of 77, consistent with its position on the applicable law,
maintains that the courts and other tribunals of the technology ac-
quiring country "shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising from
Id. at 41-42, para. A.
Id. para. A(2).
I& para. A(5).
Id. para. 7(4).
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the conditions or effects of the contract which concern public
policy (ordre public) or sovereignty. They shall also have jurisdic-
tion over conflicts of characterization."1
Contractual relationships, here clearly referring to matters of a
private nature, may be subject to choice of forum or arbitration
clauses, unless the technology acquiring country, prohibits, by ex-
press rules, such a free choice. Even where a choice of forum is
allowed, such forum must have a direct, effective and permanent
relationship with the contract. Exclusion, whether explicit or im-
plicit, of the courts or tribunals of the technology acquiring coun-
try is declared null and void.
Essentially, therefore, arbitration is allowed only with respect
to matters of private nature and even then, the choice has to con-
form to certain set criteria.
The problem of possible limits to the power of a state to
legislate on matters of private investment has not been resolved
by the Code negotiations. All are agreed that states have the
right to adopt laws, regulations and rules, and policies with
respect to transfer of technology transactions, but the perennial
problem as to what extent international law impinges on this re-
mains unresolved. Group B countries maintain that such a right is
to be exercised in accordance with their international obligations
under international law, treaties and other agreements, taking in-
to account the provisions of the Code.15 Group D's position is
somewhat more restrictive than that of Group B. According to the
former, the right to legislate and adopt other regulatory measures
is to be exercised on the basis of universally acknowledged
principles and norms of international law and treaty obligations
and with respect to the provisions of the Code. 6 The requirement
of universal acceptance obviously excludes the blanket application
of the so called traditional customary international law and
general principles recognized by the civilized nations. The Group
of 77 has moved from its earlier position of insisting on no
reference to international law at all, to accepting that parties to
transfer of technology transactions should take into consideration
"their commitments arising in this field from international treaty
obligations to which they have subscribed and the provisions of
" Id. para. B(1).
" Id. at 9, para. 3(1).
16 1&.
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the Code" maintaining as they do that the latter should be a legal-
ly binding instrument.
There are, thus, major divergences with respect to various
aspects of the resolution of problems arising from private foreign
investments. The three Groups have different views as to what
law should apply, what tribunals should be seized of the problem,
and the limits to the state power to control, by legislation or
otherwise, transactions involving foreign private investments.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT FORTY YEARS
Why forty years? The period is arbitrary. So is the choice of the
year 2000 or any other. The period seems reasonable however, to
the extent that one might begin to have some impressions as to
how the present bottlenecks epitomized by the failure of the
North-South Dialogue, the two U.N. Development Decades, and
perhaps the outcome of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth U.N.
Development Decades, if they have not in the meantime been
overtaken by events, to contribute to universally acceptable
norms and institutions for the resolution of international problems
arising out of private foreign investments.
One discerns some basic contradictions in the relations between
the western developed countries and the developing countries.
Neither trusts the other's laws or institutions. The developing
countries, because the laws have been fashioned in such a manner
that they consider them as antithetical to their basic interests in-
sist on the position not only that their own laws apply, but that
they should be applied by their own tribunals. They fear that even
if their laws were to be applied by the tribuanls of developed
western countries, there is the danger of their being rejected or
interpreted contrary to the intentions of the drafters of these
legislations.
The developed western countries, on the other hand, would
prefer that the traditional laws they have fashioned over cen-
turies should, with marginal modifications, be applied to private
foreign investments by their own tribunals.
When it comes down to it, however, it is neither the law nor the
institutions by themselves that are the obstacles. It is the
economic policies embodied in the laws and the orientation of the
lawyers who interpret and apply these laws that make prospects
of removing the stigma of underdevelopment from the social
science dictionary most improbable. Some Third World countries
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like Brazil, Mexico or India among others, might be under the illu-
sion that they are about to join the club of the developed countries
because either oil has been found in abundance in their territories
or they can count a large number of industrial complexes, ir-
respective of who owns or controls them, the percentage of value
added, or the extent to which the technological processes and
managerial knowhow needed to produce both the capital and con-
sumption goods have been internalized." This had led to certain
authors predicting a schism in the Group of 77. For the moment,
however, all the members of Group of 77 are dependent and none
can count itself as developed. They, therefore, have a common in-
terest in maintaining a unified front against the rest of the
developed world.
As long as there exists a basic inequality between the
developed and undeveloped countries18 the struggle to alter or
maintain the rules of the game will persist. The prediction is that
the struggle will last out the next forty years. But there will be a
net gain for the Third World. Education, or maleducation is
becoming increasingly available, and there is bound to be increas-
ing consciousness among the peoples of the developing, or rather
underdeveloped countries, even among the maleducated. Conse-
quently, there is going to be a clearer understanding of class in-
terests leading to further polarization of the classes. Govern-
ments, whether left or right, but more logically the former, are
bound to be more responsive to the basic needs of the population
of the Third World countries. The developed countries, in spite of
their capacity to adjust to new situations and to overcome new
crises, will learn that even they have limitations. The more and
the better Third World countries are organized the more they will
realize that there is no hope in striving to maintain the status quo
underscored, as it is, with basically exploitative tendencies.
Both sides are bound to give and gradually by the time the for-
ty years run out the world will have accepted the primary role
of national regulation. Some rules might have been evolved at the
international level, but they will create minimal norms or stan-
dards. The fact of the matter is that in the field of international
'7 Some people would like to call them developing without indicating from what base
development is to be gauged.
18 It must be pointed out that India has achieved a considerable measure of industrializa-
tion, but still remains underdeveloped.
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economic transactions, international law is still in an embroynic
stage. It is bound to remain more or less the same in the next for-
ty years. This is why we believe that those states that have the
capcity and right political orientation to do so will resort more and
more to national action.

